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INTRODUCTION

In 1994, Rwanda erupted into one of the most appalling cases of
genocide that the world had witnessed since World War II. The United
Nations (UN) Security Council, having recently created an international
criminal tribunal for humanitarian law violators in the European States of the
former Yugoslavia, decided it could do no less for African Rwanda. Since
the Rwandan conflict was internal rather than international, the statute for its
tribunal complements rather than replicates that of its Yugoslavian counterpart. Because the statute for the International Criminal Rwandan Tribunal
(ICTR) contains a number of legal innovations, it will contribute significantly
to the development of the humanitarian law of internal armed conflict. This
article analyzes these innovations. It also discusses the background of the
genocide, the creation of the tribunal, and its substantive and procedural law,

* Professor of Anthropology and Visiting Professor of Law, University of Florida.
Ph.D. Harvard University; J.D. University of Florida. Member of the Florida and American
Bar Associations. Special Counsel to the Association of Third World Studies. Expert on
Mission with the UN Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague during the
summer of 1995. Ideas expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of either the
Rwandan or the Yugoslavian Tribunal.
The author dedicates this article to all those Rwandans who have suffered during the
1994 tragedy and its aftermath.
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as well as its initial activity.
II.

BACKGROUND

Following the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana
in a plane shot down by unknown assailants on April 6, 1994, Rwanda burst
into horrifying violence, which resulted in the murder of about 800,000
people (mostly Tutsi), the uprooting of about two million within Rwanda's
borders, and the exodus of over two million (mostly Hut) to the neighboring
countries of Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda.' Soon after
Habyarimana's death, extremist Hut militias, the Presidential Guard, and the
Hut-dominated national army unleashed a systematic campaign of murder
and genocide against hundreds of moderate and opposition Hut and all
Tutsi.2
Rwanda had been Africa's most densely populated country, with rural
peasants constituting the bulk of its inhabitants.' It had a pre-genocide
population of approximately eight million,4 all speaking Ikinyarwanda, a
Bantu language.5 About 85% of the people were Hut, 14% Tutsi, and 1%
Batwa or Pygmies. 6 Generations of intermarriage had reduced, but not
eliminated, inter-population physical differences
Pre-colonial rule by the minority but aristocratic Tutsi, as well as indirect
rule later by Belgian colonialists through Tutsi royalty, had created
resentment among the majority Hutu.8 Rwanda became independent of
Belgium in 1962, and various Hut factions controlled the government and
military until July 1994.' Periodically throughout the period of independence there were outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence, resulting in the flight of
Tutsi to surrounding countries, especially to Uganda where they formed the

1. See GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995);
COLETE BRAECKMAN, RWANDA: HISTOIRE D'UN G-NOCIDE (1994) (describing in detail the

Rwandan events related in this article).
2.

PRUNIER, supra note 1, at 192-257.

3. Theodor Hanf, Rwanda, in 20 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 308 (Bernard Johnston ed.,
1980).
4. PRUNIER, supra note 1, at 4.

5. Hanf, supra note 3.
6. Id.; see also CATHARINE NEWBURY, THE COHESION OF OPPRESSION: CLIENTSHIP AND
ETHNICITY IN RWANDA: 1860-1960 (1988) (discussing clientship and shifting ethnicity in
Rwanda).
7. See PRUNIER, supra note 1, at 5; RICHARD F. NYROP ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR
RWANDA 44-47 (1969).
8. The political history of Rwanda and its important relations with surrounding countries,
especially Burundi, are beyond the scope of this article. For these important topics, see
generally BRAECKMAN, supra note 1; DIxON KAMUKAMA, RWANDA CONFLICT: ITS ROOTS

AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS (1993); RENE LEMARCHAND, RWANDA AND BURUNDI (1970);
PRUNIER, supra note 1.
9. PRUNIER, supra note 1, at 54, 74-213.
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Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its army.'0 In the 1960s, some exiled
Tutsi invaded Rwanda in unsuccessful attempts to regain power."
Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, came to power in 1973 as
the result of a military coup. During his twenty-one years of rule (19731994), there were no Tutsi mayors or governors, only one Tutsi military2
officer, two Tutsi members of parliament, and one Tutsi cabinet minister.
In addition, Hutu in the military were prohibited from marrying Tutsi, 13 and
all citizens were required to carry ethnic identity cards.' 4 Habyarimana
promoted a policy of internal repression against Tutsi. In the 1990s,
especially, his government indiscriminately interned and persecuted Tutsi,
solely because of their ethnic identity, claiming they were actual or potential
accomplices of the RPF.' 5 From 1990 to 1993 Hutu ultra-nationalists killed
an estimated 2000 Tutsi; they also targeted human rights advocates,
regardless of their ethnicity. 6
The genocide campaign following Habyarimana's death ended in July
1994 when the RPF army routed the Hutu militias and army. The RPF and
moderate Hutu political parties formed a new government on July 18, 1994,
but the country was in chaos. 7 The government pledged to implement the
Arusha peace agreement on power sharing, previously reached by
Habyarimana's regime and the RPF on August 3, 1993.'8 On August 10,
1995, in a presidential statement, the UN Security Council called upon the
new Rwandan government to ensure that there would be no reprisals against
Hutu wishing to return to their homes and resume their work, reminded the
government of its responsibility for a national reconciliation, and emphasized
that the Arusha19 peace agreement constituted an appropriate framework for

reconciliation.

The new Rwandan government was a coalition of twenty-two ministers

10. Id.
11. Id. at 93-95.
12. Id. at 75.
13. Id.
14. Id. For purposes of these identity cards, ethnicity was determined by patrilineal
descent. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, RWANDA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (1994), available in
LEXIS, News Library. Hence, even the children of mixed marriages were classified, for
example, as Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, depending on the identity cards of their fathers. Id.
15. Villia Jefremovas, Acts of Human Kindness: Tutsi, Hutu, and the Genocide, 23 ISSUE
28, 29 (1995); Catharine Newbury, Background to Genocide in Rwanda, 23 ISSUE 12, 14
(1995).
16. Newbury, supra note 15, at 14.
17. PRUNIER, supra note 1, at 299.
18. Id. at 329.
19. U.N. SCOR, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 3414th mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/42 (1994).
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drawn from the RPF (with nine ministers) and four other political parties.2"
Both Tutsi and Hutu were among the top government officials. Pasteur
Bizimungu, a Hutu, was named President, while Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, was
appointed Vice-President and Minister of Defense.2 Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu, was Prime Minister until late August 1995, when he was replaced
by.Pierre Claver Rwigema, also a Hutu.22 The government committed itself
to building a multiparty democracy and to discontinuing the ethnic
classification system utilized by the previous regime.23
Shortly after the new regime had established itself, the prime minister
reportedly stated that his government might prosecute and execute over
30,000 Hutu for murder, genocide, and other crimes committed during
Rwanda's holocaust.2 4 The U.S. government, fearing that such a prospect
would amount to a new cycle of retribution and keep Hum refugees from
returning home, sent John Shattuck, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights, to Kigali (Rwanda'scapital) to encourage the government to
delay its plans for prosecution in favor of judicial action by an international
tribunal.25
III.

CREATING THE ICTR

On July 1, 1994, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 935 in
which it requested the Secretary General to establish a commission of experts
to determine whether serious breaches, including genocide, of humanitarian
law had been committed in Rwanda.26 In the fall of 1994, the commission
reported to the Security Council that genocide and systematic, widespread,
and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law had been committed
in Rwanda, resulting in massive loss of life.27 On November 8, 1994, the
U.N. Secretary General submitted the ICTR Statute to the Security Council,
stating that he was "convinced" that "the prosecution of persons responsible

20. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994,
S. Print 12, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1994).
21. Id.
22. Rwanda 's Prime Minister Leaves Office Suddenly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at 2.
23. Raymond Bonner, Rwanda's Leaders Vow to Build a Multiparty State for Both Hutu
and Tutsi, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994, at A10.
24. Holly Burkhalter, Ending the Cycle of Retributionin Rwanda, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 22,
1994, at 19.
25. Id. The U.S. government probably underestimated the enormity of the judicial task.
Thousands of people were directly involved in acts of genocide, but the U.N. ICTR will be
able to prosecute only about 50 persons a year. Hubert Kahl, Rwanda Traumatized by Images
ofDeath, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Apr. 4, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library; see also
Burkhalter, supra note 24, at 19-20.
26. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 3400th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).
27. Letter Dated I October 1994 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994).
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for serious violations of international humanitarian law [in Rwanda] ...
would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the
He recommended that this
restoration and maintenance of peace."2
tribunal, like the one created by the Security Council in 1993 for the former
Yugoslavia, be established under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.2 9 Given
the urgency of the situation, the Secretary General did not involve the
General Assembly in the drafting or review of the statute. Subsequently,
however, the General Assembly passed its own resolution welcoming the
ICTR's establishment.3
The Security Council adopted the Secretary General's report and the
Ironically, Rwanda was the only Security
ICTR Statute without change.
32
Rwanda expressed three objections.3 3 It
Council member to vote no.
wanted the ICTR Statute to contain a provision for capital punishment.34
It also preferred that the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR extend back to
1990 to cover earlier crimes, and it wanted the ICTR to be based in Rwanda
itself.35 The ICTR Statute, as accepted by the Security Council, excludes
capital punishment and limits temporal jurisdiction to 1994. The Security
Council preferred to locate the ICTR in a neighboring state. 36 Furthermore,
the Security Council rejected Kigali's proposal that Rwandan judges sit on
the ICTR.37 Initially, Rwandan President Bizimungu publicly criticized the
Security Council vote saying it would only lead to a "secret" court that

28. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR].
29. Id. at 3; see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of
International HumanitarianLaw and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal, 18
FORD. INT'L L. J. 1191 (1995) (discussing the establishment of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia); see also Paul J. Magnarella, Tryingfor Peace Through Law: The UN
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 10 HuMAN PEACE 3-8 (1995) (describing and analyzing
of the ICTR's legal structure); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and Development
of InternationalLaw, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1994); Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the
Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J.INT'L L.
266 (1994).
30. Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 100(c)
at 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/206 (1995).
31. See ICTR, supra note 28.
32. The Security Council adopted the resolution sponsored by the United States and New
Zealand by a vote of thirteen to one, with China abstaining. Julia Preston, Tribunal Set on
Rwanda War Crimes: Kigali Votes No on U.N. Resolution, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at
A44.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The ICTR was subsequently placed in Arusha, Tanzania. S.C. Res. 977, U.N. SCOR,
3502nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (1995).
37. Preston, supra note 32, A44.
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would "exonerate" the true organizers of the genocide. 8 Later, however,
a Rwandan spokesperson said his government would cooperate fully with the
U.N. court. 39 Rwanda's only realistic hope of bringing the major instigators
of the genocide to justice is through the ICTR. Most of those chiefly
responsible for acts of genocide have fled the country, and Rwanda lacks the
political leverage, the extradition treaties, and the resources necessary to gain
custody of and try them.4 °
One of the most innovative and expeditious recommendations in the
Secretary General's report was that of establishing the tribunal through the
exercise of the Security Council's powers under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.4' As Antonio Cassese, the eventual President of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, explained, "The traditional
approach of establishing such a body by treaty was discarded as being too
slow (possibly taking many years to reach full ratification) and insufficiently
effective since Member States could not be forced to ratify such a treaty
against their wishes. 4 2 By going the Chapter VII route, the Security
Council obliged all U.N. member states to cooperate with the ICTR and to
honor any lawful requests it makes for assistance under its Statute.
Specifically, Articles 39, 41, and 48 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
provide the legal basis for the Security Council's establishment of the
ICTR.43 Article 39 states that the Security Council shall determine when
threats to peace exist, and shall, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,
determine what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international
peace and security." While Article 42 addresses military actions, Article
41 provides that "[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures." ' 5 Article 41 goes on to list the kinds of actions, for
example, interruptions of economic and communication tie, that these

38. Rwandan President Says UN Wants "Secret" Trials on Rwanda, Agence France
Presse, Nov. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library.
39. Anni Thomas, Rwandan Government Promises to Work with War Crimes Court,
Agence France Presse, Nov. 24, 1994, LEXIS, News Library.
40. See Alphonse Marie Nkubito, Statement by the Minister of Justice of Rwanda to the
First Public Hearing of the First Session of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
at The Hague (June 27, 1995) (transcript).
41. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 48.
42. U.N. Doc. A/49/342, S/1994/1007 (1994).
43. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 48.
44. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Presumably, the Security Council regarded the massive flow
of refugees and the remnants of the Hutu militias to neighboring countries as a threat to international peace.
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
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'
measures "may include."46
Although Article 41 does not include judicial
measures in its list expressly, it does not preclude them.47 Further, the use
of the phrase "may include" denotes that the list is not exhaustive.48
Article 48 obligates U.N. member states to support the Security Council's
decision by cooperating in its implementation. 49 The Article provides that
"[t]he action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council
may determine."5

IV.

COMPOSITION OF THE ICTR

The ICTR consists of two trial chambers with three judges each, an
appeals chamber with five judges, the office of the prosecutor, and a
registry.51 In January 1995, the United Nations appointed Honore
Rakotomanana, the former President of the Supreme Court of Madagascar,
as Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the ICTR. 52 He works out of an office in
Kigali, under the supervision of Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the U.N.
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia located in The Hague, The
Netherlands.5 3 In June 1995, the six trial judges and five appeals judges
took their oaths and held their first plenary session in The Hague. All were
elected and appointed by the United Nations. The trial judges are from
Sweden, Senegal, Bangladesh, Russia, South Africa, and Tanzania. The
ICTR appeals chamber is comprised of judges from the U.N. Tribunal for
former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Its judges are from Egypt, Italy, Canada,
China, and Australia. The judges elected Judge Laity Kama of Senegal as
the ICTR's President. The ICTR's registrar and chief administrative officer
is Andronido Adede, a Kenyan attorney, who has served as Deputy Director
of the Codification Division in the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs. 4

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. U.N. CHARTER art. 48.

50. Id.
51. ICTR, supra note 28, arts. 10-11.
52. U.N. Appoints Prosecutorfor Rwandan Tribunal,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at A6.
53. Barbara Crossette, Canadianto Lead Panels on Atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at A7. Canadian judge Louise Arbour replaced prosecutor
Richard Goldstone in Oct. 1996. Id.
54. Friday Highlights, Fed. News Serv., § U.N. Package, Sept. 11, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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THE ICTR's JURISDICTION

Article 1 of the ICTR Statute" limits the ICTR's temporal jurisdiction
to the year 1994 only. Article 1 also states that the ICTR "shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens
responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighboring
states."56 Consequently, the Statute gives the ICTR both personal and
territorial jurisdiction in Rwanda as well as limited personal and territorial
jurisdiction in surrounding states. By contrast, the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia grants that Tribunal jurisdiction
"in the territory of the former Yugoslavia" only.57
By granting the ICTR the competence to prosecute Rwandans who
allegedly committed certain crimes abroad, the Security Council has added
a new dimension to the humanitarian law of non-international armed conflict.
Rwanda formally requested the creation of a tribunal, and thereby voluntarily
surrendered some of its jurisdiction to the Security Council's judicial
creation. By contrast, according to the Statute, Rwanda's neighbors must
surrender some of their jurisdiction to the ICTR without choice.5 8 All
states, of course, have the competence to prosecute Rwandans for crimes
committed within their territories. However, because by its Statute the ICTR
has primacy over the national courts of all states,59 it may formally request
that any neighboring state's court defer certain cases to its competence. This
request carries with it the threat of a penalty for non-compliance.6 ° Should
any state notified of a deferral request not respond satisfactorily within sixty
days, "the [Tribunal's] Trial Chamber may request the President to report the
matter to the Security Council," 6' which presumably will consider sanctions.
Requiring states to surrender their competence to prosecute persons for
criminal acts committed on their own territories to a U.N. Security Council
creation is another novel use of U.N. Charter Chapter VII. Whether
surrounding states will voluntarily accept or protest this demand on their
sovereignty remains to be seen. State action and reaction, and claims and
responses will determine whether this kind of measure, taken by the Security
55. ICTR, supra note 28, at 1.
56. Id.
57. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704 art. 1 (1993) (statute establishing Former Yugoslavia Tribunal
art. 1).
58. ICTR, supra note 28, arts. 7-8.
59. Id. art. 8(2).
60. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, ITR/3/Rev.1,
Rules 59, 61 (1995) [hereinafter ICTR Rules].
61. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss3/5
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Council under Chapter VII, will become an accepted principle of international law to be applied again in the future.
VI.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Because the Security Council is not a legislative body, it had no
competency to enact substantive law for the ICTR.62 Instead, it authorized
the ICTR to apply existing international humanitarian law applicable to noninternational armed conflict.63 The humanitarian law included in the ICTR's
Statute consists of the Genocide Convention,' which was ratified by
Rwanda, crimes against humanity as defined by the Nuremberg Charter,6 5
Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, 66 and Additional Protocol
1167 also ratified by Rwanda. Both the prohibition and punishment of acts
of genocide and crimes against humanity are part of customary international
law, imposing legal obligations on all states.68
Article 2 of the Statute69 replicates Articles 2 and 3 of the Genocide
Convention.7" Article 2(2) defines genocide as any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial, or religious group: killing group members; causing serious bodily or
mental harm to group members; deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions calculated to bring about its complete or partial physical
destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group;
and forcibly transferring children to another group.7 Persons who commit
genocide or who attempt, conspire, or incite others to commit genocide are
punishable.7"
Similar to the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention obligates
States Parties to enact the legislation necessary to provide effective penalties

62. U.N. CHARTER arts. 24-26.
63. ICTR, supra note 28, art. 1.
64. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
65. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544,
1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284 [hereinafter IMT Charter].
66. Geneva Conventions Nos. 970-73, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287.
67. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol II].
68. HILAIRE McCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAW 140 (1990); Meron,

supra note 29, at 79.
69. ICTR, supra note 28, art. 2.
70. Genocide Convention, supra note 64, at 280.
71. ICTR, supra note 28, art. 2(2).
72. Id. art. 2(3).
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for persons guilty of genocide.7 3 Article 6 of the Genocide Convention also
requires that persons charged with genocide be tried in the territory where the
act was committed, "or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction. ' '7 Consequently, the surrounding states of Zaire
and Tanzania, as ratifying parties to the Genocide Convention, undertake to
charge persons responsible for genocide in Rwanda and to extradite them for
prosecution either back to Rwanda or to a competent international tribunal
that they recognize.
Since the Convention's entrance into force in 1951, the only international
tribunals competent to prosecute those accused of genocide in limited
geographic areas have been the ones established by the Security Council for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. By virtue of Chapter VII obligations
under the U.N. Charter, all U.N. members, including Burundi, Uganda, and
Kenya, which have not ratified the Genocide Convention, are required to
recognize these tribunals and send indicted suspects to them.75 Non-U.N.
members, however, can decide for themselves whether they wish to recognize
these international tribunals for purposes of surrendering indictees.
Obligations to prevent and punish acts of genocide are not confined
merely to the 107 states that have ratified the Genocide Convention.76
Because the prevention and the punishment of genocide have become part of
customary international law, the International Court of Justice has noted that
"the principles underlying the [Genocide] Convention are principles which
are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional ratification."77
Article 3, "Crimes against Humanity," of the ICTR Statute 78 resembles
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter.79 Article 3 empowers the ICTR to
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as
part of a widespread and systematic attack against any civilian population on
national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds: murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on
political, racial, and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts.80
73. Genocide Convention, supra note 64, art.5.
74. Id. art. 6.

75. See U.N. CHARTER art. 48.

76. See InternationalInstruments Relating to Human Rights, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 51-67
(1994) (listing states that had ratified the Genocide Convention and other human

rights/humanitarian law conventions as of January 1, 1994) [hereinafter International
Instruments].

77. Advisory Opinion No. 12, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. (May 28), at 15.
78. ICTR, supra note 28, art. 3.
79. IMT Charter, supra note 65, art. 6(c).
80. ICTR, supra note 28, art. 3.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss3/5
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Employing the Nuremberg concept of crimes against humanity in
Rwanda constitutes an important legal development. The Nuremberg Charter
was established to prosecute "war criminals,"'" and it explicitly defined
crimes against humanity as specified inhumane acts committed "before or
during the war."'8 2 Traditionally, war was defined as a state of armed
conflict between two or more states,8 3 but legal experts debated about the
legal criteria of war, for example, whether a formal declaration of war is
required, whether there can be domestic war, and whether the parties must
be recognized states.84
Some legalists may now wonder whether applying the Nuremberg
Charter to Rwanda's internal conflict is appropriate. Although the Charter
is explicitly included in the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 5 that conflict did involve more than one state, and
consequently meets the war criterion of the Charter. The ICTR Statute
86
characterizes the situation in Rwanda as an internal armed conflict.
Hence, it does not include the "grave breaches" sections of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which apply to international armed conflict and are regarded as
customary international law. 7 By containing the Nuremberg concept of
crimes against humanity in its Statute, the ICTR represents an important
extension of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts. The U.N.
Security Council, the ICTR's creator, has ignored the ambiguity of the war
concept, and with its authoritative voice has made crimes against humanity
an internal as well as an international offense of customary international law.
Article 4 empowers the ICTR to prosecute persons committing or
ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocol II thereto of
1977.8 These violations include: (1) violence to life, health, and physical
or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, torture, or mutilation;
(2) collective punishments; (3) taking of hostages; (4) acts of terrorism; (5)
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault; (6)
pillage; (7) sentences or executions rendered extra-judicially or without due

81. IMT Charter, supra note 65, art. 6.
82. Id. art. 6(c).
83. 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE: DIsPUTES, WAR, AND
NEUTRALITY 202 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
84. INGRID D. DE Lupis, THE LAW OF WAR 5-23 (1987).
85. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, art. 1(a) at 9, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter

Report].
86. ICTR, supra note 28, at 2.
87. Report, supra note 85, IM37-38.
88. ICTR, supra note 28, art. 4.
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89
process; and (8) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Neither Article 3 Common nor Protocol II applies to conflicts of an
international nature. Rwanda's neighbors, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zaire, but not Kenya, have ratified both the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol 11.90 However, unlike the grave breaches sections of the Geneva
Conventions, Article 3 Common and Protocol II do not require ratifying
parties to criminalize the above acts or to prosecute or extridite alleged
violators either to the state on whose territory their acts occurred or to a
competent international tribunal. 9' As noted above, each U.N. member state
is obligated under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to cooperate with Security
Council measures taken to maintain international peace. 92 Article 28 of the
Tribunal's statute specifies that states shall cooperate with the ICTR and
comply without undue delay with any request for assistance, including the
arrest or detention of persons and the surrender of the accused to the
ICTR.93 Consequently, the U.N. Security Council, through its creation of
the ICTR has added a compulsory arrest and surrender requirement to acts
that the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II had previously conceptualized
as being governed by domestic discretion. This represents another important
extension of humanitarian law.
The Security Council's and the Secretary General's decision that the
ICTR should have jurisdiction over natural persons and not juridical persons,
such as associations, is reflected in Article 5.94 Accordingly, membership
alone in a criminal organization would not be sufficient to subject someone
to the ICTR's jurisdiction.
Article 6 addresses "individual criminal
''
95
responsibility.
It states that any person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed, or aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of
any crime mentioned in Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute shall be individually
responsible for the crime.96 An accused's official position, even as
president or prime minister, shall not relieve him of responsibility or mitigate
punishment. 97 Furthermore, superiors are criminally responsible for the
criminal acts of their subordinates if they knew of the acts and did not take
reasonably necessary measures to prevent or stop them.98
Although
following government orders will not relieve subordinates of criminal

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

ICTR, supra note 28, art. 4.
InternationalInstruments, supra note 76, at 63.
See ICTR, supra note 28, art. 28.
U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
ICTR, supra note 28, art. 28.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 6(1).
Id. art. 6(2).
Id. art. 6(3).
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responsibility, it may mitigate their punishment if the ICTR determines that
justice so requires. 99 The doctrine of individual responsibility for violations
of humanitarian law was emphasized in the post-World War II Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials. 1' ° The doctrine was codified in the Geneva Conventions
of 1949.'
VII.

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND ICTR PRIMACY

Given the magnitude of the crimes committed in Rwanda, the successful
prosecution of all those responsible would greatly exceed the resource
capacity of the ICTR 0 2 Therefore, Article 8 states that "[t]he International
Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
to prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such
violations committed in the territory of neighboring States. 10 3 However,
the ICTR Statute goes on to state that the ICTR "shall have primacy over
national courts of all States," such that it may formally request national
courts to defer to its competence. °4
To respect the principle of non-bis-in-idem and to avoid the potential for
double jeopardy, Article 9 states that no person tried by the ICTR shall be
retried by a national court for the same acts. 0 5 However, persons already
tried by a national court for crimes covered by Articles 2 to 4 may be retried
by the ICTR if the litigated acts had been characterized as ordinary crimes,
the case was not diligently prosecuted, or the national court proceedings were
neither impartial nor independent or were designed to shield the accused from
international responsibility.'O
VIII.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

The ICTR's Rules of Procedure are based on those of the Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia.' °7 They incorporate the fundamental due process
guarantees to a fair and speedy trial found in Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).'0 8 Consequently, the

99. Id. art. 6(4).
100. DE LuPis, supra note 84, at 353-54.
101. Id. at 354.
102. One Africanist estimates that the number of Rwandans directly involved in the acts
of killing amounted to between 75,000 and 150,000. Jefremovas, supra note 15, at 28.
103. ICTR, supra note 28, art. 8(1).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 8(2).
art. 9(1).
art. 9(2).
art. 14.
arts. 19-20.
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ICTR, like its counterpart for the former Yugoslavia, will become a medium
whereby international human rights standards will have significant influence
on the development of international criminal law. Its due process guarantees
include: the right to the presumption of innocence,"° the right against selfincrimination,"' the right to counsel of choice or to free legal assistance if
indigent,"' the right to inspect prosecution's incriminating and exculpatory
evidence," 2 the right to privileged communication with counsel," 3 the right
to public proceedings," 4 the right to challenge the prosecution's evidence
6
and to present evidence in one's defense,"' and the right of appeal."
Only the prosecutor or his duly delegated deputy may commence a
proceeding by submitting an indictment supported by evidence to a
designated ICTR judge for confirmation." 7 Victims, states, or nonorganizations may not initiate proceedings before the
governmental
118
ICTR.
Once a judge confirms an indictment, he or she may issue arrest and
search warrants." 9 The ICTR's registrar transmits the arrest warrant to the
national authorities of the state having jurisdiction over the accused "together
with instructions that at the time of the arrest the indictment and statement
of the rights of the accused be read to him in a language he understands."' 120 The arresting state's authorities shall notify the Registrar and
arrange to transfer the accused to the seat of the ICTR where the President
will arrange for his detention. 2 ' The accused will be detained in a U.N.supervised prison in Arusha. 22
If the notified state has been unable to arrest the accused, and if the
registrar has, at the prosecutor's request, published notices of the arrest
warrant in widely circulated newspapers, a trial chamber may, after finding
the prosecutor's evidence sufficient, issue an international arrest warrant that
shall be transmitted to all states. 23 The President of the ICTR has the
authority to notify the Security Council of any state that refuses to honor the

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

ICTR Rules, supra note 60, Rule 62.
Id. Rule 63.
Id. Rule 42.
Id. Rules 66-68.
Id. Rule 97.
Id. Rule 78.
Id. Rule 85.
Id. Rule 108.
Id. Rule 47.
Id.
Id. Rules 54-55.
Id. Rule 55.

121. Id. Rules 57, 64.
122. Id.
123. Id. Rule 61.
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124
ICTR's arrest warrant or that impedes the execution of such a warrant.
Soon after his arrest, the accused is brought before a trial chamber and
formally charged. 25 The trial chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused's
right to counsel is respected and that he understands the indictment.126 It
shall call on the accused to enter a plea, and should the accused fall silent,
it shall enter a plea of not guilty on his behalf. 27 The trial chamber then
instructs the Registrar to set a date for trial. 28 There are no provisions for
trials in absentia.
The ICTR is not authorized to impose the death penalty in deference to
the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR of 1989.29 This, however,
leads to an ironic situation. Owing to its limited resources, the ICTR is
expected to go after, what Prosecutor Goldstone called the "big fish," and try
at most fifty persons a year. 30 Consequently, those chiefly responsible for
the genocide would receive, if convicted by the ICTR, a sentence of years,
up to life, whereas lesser figures tried and convicted in Rwandan courts could
be sentenced to death.

IX.

THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

As it was successfully routing the Hutu army and various Hutu militias,
the RPF army began rounding up Hutu suspected of participating in the
genocide and other crimes. The International Committee of the Red Cross
claimed that by August 1996, Rwanda had about 80,000 Hutu (mostly
followers rather than leaders) crammed into antiquated, putrid prisons, and
detained indefinitely while awaiting formal charges.' 3 ' Reportedly, over
2000 people had died under these conditions. 32 Before they could be tried,
Rwanda had to rebuild its judicial system. As of February 1, 1995, Rwanda
had only a few surviving judges and not a single functioning court.'
The
trials of more than 30,000 Hutu suspected of involvement in the genocide

124. Id. Rule 61(E).
125. Id. Rule 62.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See ICTR, supra note 28, art. 23.
130. Kahl, supra note 25.
131. More than 80,000 Prisoners in Rwanda, Agence France Presse, Aug. 12, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library; Rwanda Conference Recommends Genocide Courts,
Reuters World Serv., Nov. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Rwanda
Conference]; Ruth Wedgwood, Retaliation in Rwanda, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20,
1995, at 20.
132. Rwanda Conference, supra note 131.
133. Tom Ashbrook, Rwanda's Fate Lies with Refugees, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1995, at
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had been put off indefinitely because of lack of resources.'34
In August 1996, Rwanda's parliament approved a draft genocide law
designed to expedite the trials of the thousands held in prison and to
encourage Hutu refugees to return from abroad.'3 5 The draft legislation,
which had yet to be endorsed by the constitutional court and signed by the
President before it could become law, covers offenses committed between
1990 and 1994, versus only 1994 for the ICTR, so as to deal with the
massacres that occurred during the civil war prior to President Habyarimana's
death. 3 6 It distinguishes genocide planners and mass murderers from
others and offers reduced prison sentences to the latter if they confess.' 37
According to the draft law, architects of the genocide and those
responsible for murdering fifty or more people will face the death penalty' 3 Persons confessing to the murder of fewer than fifty people will
serve only seven to twelve years in prison. 3 9 Those confessing to rape or
other violent crimes will serve three years or less."
In addition, courts
will treat property crimes as civil offenses, offering victims the opportunity
to sue for damages. 14' By proposing such lenient penalties for such serious
crimes, the new government is trying to convince its Hutu citizens and the
world community that it is not bent on revenge. In June 1996, Rwanda's
Ministry of Justice offered a crash training course for magistrates, who
should begin adjudicating cases once this new legislation is approved.'42
The Rwandan government has pledged to guarantee the safe return of the
approximately two million refugees' 43 living abroad in sprawling and
unsanitary camps.'" However, it is concerned about Hutu extremists
waging an insurgency campaign from the camps located in Tanzania and
Zaire, where Hutu militias are reportedly forcibly inducting young men into
their units and threatening to invade Rwanda to retake power.'45 According

134. Rwanda Opens the Trial of 14 in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1995, at A12.
135. lain Guest, For Rwandan Genocide Survivors, It's Pragmatism vs. Revenge,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 30, 1996, at 19; OAU Human Rights Officials Express
Supportfor Rwandan Genocide Courts, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 13, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library.
136. Guest, supra note 135, at19.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Rwanda May Institute Truth Commission, Africa News Serv., June 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library.
143. Elif Kaban, Rwanda Pledges to Do More to Heal Ethnic Rifts, Reuters N. Am. Wire,
Nov. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library.
144. UN. Council Urges Rwandan Tribunal to Begin Trials, Reuters N. Am. Wire, Oct.
17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter UN. Council].
145. Kaban, supra note 143.
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to U.N. observers, from May to June of 1996 Hutu extremists had killed
ninety-nine witnesses to the genocide in order to prevent them from testifying
before either Rwandan courts or the ICTR. 1 Many of those murdered had
lived in Rwanda's Gisenyi province, located just across the Zairian border
from Hum refugee camps. 47 Since there is so little documentary evidence
on much of the 1994 killing, prosecutors will have to rely on eyewitness
accounts. Hence, the murder of key potential witnesses will hamper the
prosecutorial process.
The governments of Rwanda and Zaire announced an agreement in
August 1996 to repatriate Hutu refugees living in Zaire, to disarm former
Rwandan soldiers there, and to take serious measures against those who
prevent the repatriation. 48 However, the parties will most probably
experience great difficulty implementing this agreement. Should the refugees
return en masse, most will not find homes and work, because many houses
and fields belonging to Hutu refugees have been confiscated by Tutsi, who
themselves had returned to Rwanda after years of exile in Uganda. 4 9 'In
addition, many Hutu refugees refuse to go home for fear of revenge. In
February 1996, a Hutu, who had been invited by U.N. officials to return to
see how safe it was in Rwanda, was nearly lynched by a Tutsi mob when he
arrived in Kigali. 15 ° With respect to the revenge factor, international
organizations and western governments have been pressuring both Rwanda
and the ICTR to begin prosecuting suspects immediately, arguing that justice
is necessary for the country to move towards reconciliation.' 5 ' They hope
that once the judiciaries identify and prosecute those primarily responsible for
the genocide, Rwanda's Tutsi will believe justice is being served and will be
less likely to seek revenge on returning Hutu refugees.
X.

ICTR INDICTMENTS

Approximately one year after the genocide, the ICTR had 400 suspects
as a result of ongoing investigations.'
Most of these were officials and
146. 365 People Killed in Rwanda: UN, Agence France Presse, Aug. 22, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library.
147. Id.
148. Rwanda, Zaire Reach Agreement on Programme for Return of Refugees, BBC
summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
149. Kahl, supra note 25.
150. Hutu Tester Nearly Lynched, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Mar. 1, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library.
151. Id.; UN.Council, supra note 144. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights, John Shattuck, has stated that "we are convinced that peace and reconciliation will
come to Rwanda only if justice comes first." US. Commitment to Restoring Justice in
Rwanda, 6 DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH No. 24, June 12, 1995, .at.499.
152. Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal Holds First Session, AP, June 29, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library.
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military leaders of the former Hum-dominated regime, who had fled to other
countries. 5' 3
As noted above, all states are obligated to cooperate with the ICTR.
Such cooperation includes arresting and transferring suspects and indicted
persons to the ICTR.m In early January 1995, the heads of government
from Kenya, Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia met in
Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, and agreed to hand over to the ICTR those who
had taken part in the genocide.'
Subsequently, however, Kenyan
President Daniel Arap Moi stated that not only would he refuse to cooperate
with the ICTR, but he would also prevent the ICTR from seeking out
suspects in his country.'56 According to human rights officials, some
Kenyans have financially benefited from wealthy Rwandans from the former
government who fled to Kenya after the war broke out.' 5 7 Immediately
after Moi's remarks, ICTR Prosecutor Goldstone sent Moi a letter asking for
clarification and warning that Kenya's refusal to cooperate with the ICTR
would be regarded as a breach of Kenya's obligations under international
law, a matter for the Security Council to consider. 5 ' President Moi soon
retracted his statement, 159 but human rights watchers were doubtful about
his sincerity."
More recently, ICTR Judge Navanethem Pillay has stated that some
African states, especially Zaire and Kenya, were hampering efforts to bring
criminals to justice. 6 ' An observer explained that the Presidents of Zaire
and Kenya are more concerned about the regional balance of power than
about crimes against humanity. 62 They support Rwanda's former rulers
because they regard the successor RPF-led government as a client of
Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, their rival for leadership in East and
Central Africa.' 63 If any African State refuses to cooperate with the ICTR,
as the U.N. Charter requires, it could be sanctioned by the U.N. Security
153. Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal Holds First Session, supra note 152.
154. ICTR, supra note 28, art. 28.
155. Paul Chintowa, Rwanda - Politics: Tanzania to Repatriate Refugees, Inter Press
Serv., Jan. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library.
156. Donatella Lorch, Kenya Refuses to Hand Over Suspects in Rwanda Slayings, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1995, at A3.
157. Id.; Louis Tunbridge, Kenya "Sheltering Suspects in Rwandan Atrocities," DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 3, 1995, at 20.
158. Statement by Justice Richard Goldstone, ICTR, at The Hague, Oct. 5, 1995.
159. Kenyan Will Not ProtectRwandan Killers: Moi, Agence France Presse, Oct. 10, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library.
160. Tunbridge, supra note 157, at 20.
161. Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Judge Says Rwanda Probes Being Hampered, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. (New York), Dec. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library.
162. Lindsey Hilsum, Rwanda Justice Grinds to a Halt, THE OBSERVER, Nov. 12, 1995,
at 25.
163. Id.
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Council. Sanctions might include a moratorium on international economic
aid, something no African country can afford to lose.
The work of the ICTR had been slowed by a lack of facilities in Arusha
and by U.N. budgetary constraints."6 Finally, on December 12, 1995, the
ICTR issued its first indictments against eight Hutu, charging them with
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the Geneva Conventions.'65 By the end of August 1996, the ICTR had indicted twenty
suspects and was holding three of them in its Arusha jail."6 Those in
custody included the following:
(1) Georges Rutaganda, a vice president of the national committee of the
Interahamwe ("those who work together"), which is the Hutu youth
militia of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development and the
political vehicle of former President Habyarimana's single party
state. 167 Some observers regard members of the Interahamwe as the
main perpetrators of the genocide.' 68
(2) Jean-Paul Akayesu, the former mayor of Taba, in the Gitarama
district of central Rwanda, where at least 2000 Tutsi were killed.169
(3) Clement Kayishema, the former governor of Kibuye, who allegedly
helped organize the slaughter of ninety percent of the Tutsi residing
there.70
All three had been arrested by national authorities in Zambia and then were
transferred to the ICTR in May 1996.'17 Their trials, the first for the ICTR,
were scheduled to begin in September 1996, but were subsequently
postponed.

172

Another indictee was Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, called the mastermind
of the genocide. 17 3 He had assumed de facto control of military and
political affairs in Rwanda after the death of former president

164. Cash-Strapped LN Cuts Costs in Rwanda, Reuters World Serv., Oct. 2, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News File, REUWLD FILE.
165. Matt Bigg, Tribunal on Rwanda's Genocide Names First Suspects, Reuters N. Am.
Wire, Jan. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, New Library, REUNA File.
166. Id.
167. Peter Smerdon, UN Tribunal ChargesFirstRwandan Genocide Accused, Reuters, Ltd.,
May 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
168. PRUNTER, supra note 1, at 76, 368.
169. Smerdon, supra note 167.
170. Rwanda and Zaire: The Situation Grows More Complicated,Africa News Serv., July
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
171. Rwanda Human Rights: Tribunal Gears Up for First Trials, Inter Press Serv., Aug.
6, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
172. Id.; Francine Cunningham, Wheels of Justice Turn Slowly in Genocide Cases,
SCOTSMAN, Nov. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
173. Rwandan Colonel Indicted on Suspicion of Masterminding Genocide, Agence France
Presse, Aug. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Rwandan Colonel].
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Habyarimana.' 7 4 Bagosora had been arrested in Cameroon under an
international arrest warrant issued by Belgium in connection with the murder
of ten Belgian U.N. peacekeepers in April 1994.171 In July 1996, however,
Belgium dropped its request for extradition in deference to the ICTR and
176
Article 8(2), which addresses concurrent jurisdiction and ICTR primacy.
Three other ICTR indictees held by Cameroon authorities were Andre
Ntagerura (the former transport minister), Ferdinand Nahimana (a founder of
Radio Television Milles Collines, which had been used to incite the
genocide), and Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva (former military intelligence
chief and alleged death squad member).' 7 The Cameroon authorities
agreed to transfer all four to the ICTR in Arusha, where they will stand
78
trial.

1

As of August 1996, three indictees were being detained by national
authorities in Switzerland, Belgium, and Burkina Faso. 179 Eight others, not
in custody, were believed to be living in Zaire. 180 In each case, the ICTR
had asked national authorities to transfer the indictees to Arusha, and
prospects for their doing so appeared good.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The ICTR and its predecessor for the former Yugoslavia represent the
first attempts by the international community to create an international
judicial organ to enforce the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention,
and laws proscribing crimes against humanity. The ICTR is unique in that
it is the first international court to apply crimes against humanity to a noninternational conflict and to enforce Article 3 Common and Protocol II of the
Geneva Conventions. The extension of its territorial jurisdiction to states not
party to the Rwandan conflict represents another new development in
international law.
The exact impact that the ICTR will have on the application of
international humanitarian law and the legal prerogatives of the U.N. Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter will be determined by
actual political and judicial experience, by the reactions of states, and by the

174. Rwandan Colonel, supra note 173.

175. Id.
176. Belgium Defers to Rwanda Tribunal in Bagosora Case, Reuters World Serv., July 9,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
177. Rwandan Colonel, supra note 173.
178. Id.
179. UN TribunalIndicts Two More Suspects, Reuters, July 16, 1996, available in. LEXIS,
News Library; Burkina Prosecutor Callsfor Extradition of Rwanda Suspect, Agence France
Presse, Aug. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
180. UnitedStates and Africa: Shattuck Outlines US Supportfor Rwandan Tribunal,Africa
News Serv., June 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
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ability of the ICTR to gain custody over and prosecute a significant number
of major criminals. Both Tribunals will influence the way many states view
the causes of grave humanitarian crimes and possible strategies for achieving
peace and national reconciliation.
The mass murders in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia did not arise
spontaneously. They were instigated by persons in positions of power who
sought to gain personal advantages through violent and hideous means.
Unless these persons are held accountable for their crimes against humanity,
the reconciliation necessary for the reconstruction of these torn societies may
not be possible. By assigning guilt to the leader-instigators, the tribunals also
may lift the burden of collective guilt that settles on societies whose leaders
have directed or ordered such terrible violence. The assignment of guilt by
neutral tribunals also may enable the international community to differentiate
between victims and aggressors. It may help erase the belief that interethnic
conflicts are genetically inbred and therefore insoluble.
The success of the Tribunals is essential if future crimes against humanity
are to be prevented. If human rights can be massively violated with impunity
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, we can expect new Hitlers to crop up
wherever political advantages can conceivably be gained by committing
crimes against humanity. Even if the Tribunals do not accomplish their main
prosecutorial objectives, their creation will still have a lasting effect on the
application of humanitarian law to both intemational and domestic conflicts.
They also will have accomplished, as Prosecutor Goldstone has stated, the
significant task of putting international humanitarian law and human rights
18
squarely on the international agenda. 1

181. Christian Tyler, Bloodhound in Pursuit of the Dogs of War: Christian Tyler Meets
Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutorof the UN War Crimes Tribunal, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1996, at xx.
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